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Abstract. Internet-wide scans are a common active measurement approach to
study the Internet, e.g., studying security properties or protocol adoption. They
involve probing large address ranges (IPv4 or parts of IPv6) for specific ports or
protocols. Besides their primary use for probing (e.g., studying protocol adop-
tion), we show that—at the same time—they provide valuable insights into the
Internet control plane informed by ICMP responses to these probes—a currently
unexplored secondary use. We collect one week of ICMP responses (637.50M
messages) to several Internet-wide ZMap scans covering multiple TCP and UDP
ports as well as DNS-based scans covering > 50% of the domain name space.
This perspective enables us to study the Internet’s control plane as a by-product of
Internet measurements. We receive ICMP messages from ∼171M different IPs in
roughly 53K different autonomous systems. Additionally, we uncover multiple
control plane problems, e.g., we detect a plethora of outdated and misconfigured
routers and uncover the presence of large-scale persistent routing loops in IPv4.
1 Introduction
Internet scans are a valuable and thus widely used approach to understand and track the
evolution of the Internet as one of the most complex systems ever created by humans.
They are widely applied in different fields, including networking and security research:
e.g., to find vulnerable systems [9], to measure the liveness of IP addresses [3], or
to measure the deployability of new protocols, features [11], or their evolution [34].
Advances in scanning methodologies enabled probing the entire IPv4 address space
for a single port within minutes or hours, depending on the available bandwidth and
configured scan rate (see tools such as ZMap [10] or MASSCAN [18]). Thereby, regular
scans of the entire IPv4 address space have become feasible, e.g., providing an insightful
perspective into protocol evolution (see e.g., QUIC [32]). This line of scan-based works
has created a rich body of contributions with valuable insights into Internet structure
and evolution. These works have in common that they focus on one particular feature or
protocol as their objective to study (primary use).
In this work, we argue that Internet-wide scans have a less explored secondary
use to study the Internet control plane while scanning for their primary use, e.g., to
detect routing loops while primarily probing for QUIC-capable servers. That is, we
study Internet control plane responses sent via ICMP as response to non-ICMP probe
packets (e.g., QUIC) and show that Internet-wide scans are a hidden treasure in that
they produce a rich ICMP dataset that is currently neglected, e.g., to uncover network
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Tab. 1: Weekly scan schedule fueling our dataset, DNS-based scans use our own resolver
infrastructure. For IPv4-wide scans, we utilize ZMap.
problems. The interesting aspect is that these ICMP-responses are a valuable secondary
use that is generated as by-product of any Internet-wide scan. They thus enable to study
the Internet control plane (e.g., to detect routing loops) without requiring dedicated scans
(as performed a decade ago [21, 37]) that would increase the scanning footprint.
Our observations on the Internet’s control plane are fueled by regular ZMap scans of
the IPv4 address space for multiple TCP and UDP ports as well as DNS-based scans of
top lists and zone files for mainly TLS, HTTP/2, and QUIC. We evaluate one full week
of ICMP responses to multi-protocol Internet-scans covering the entire IPv4 address
space and > 50% of the domain name space(base domains).
Our contributions are as follows:
– We propose to use Internet-wide scans to study the Internet control plane via ICMP
response, e.g., to detect routing loops or misconfigurations.
– Within our one week observation period, we collect∼637.50M ICMP messages which
we make available at [23].
– We shed light on how Internet-scans trigger ICMP responses across the Internet.
– Our data shows a plethora of misconfigured systems e.g., sending ICMP redirects
across the Internet or producing deprecated source quench messages.
– We find many networks and hosts to be unreachable, our scans uncover large sets of
unreachable address space due to routing loops.
– We provide a growing ICMP dataset at https://icmp.netray.io.
Structure. The next section (Section 2) starts by providing an overview of our ICMP
dataset. Following this, we dive into our dataset and dissect it (Section 3). Driven by
our findings, we inspect unreachable hosts due to routing loops and quantifies their
presence in today’s Internet (Section 4). Finally, we discuss related works (Section 5)
and conclude the paper (Section 6).
2 Scan Infrastructure & Dataset
Infrastructure. Our scans are sourced by two different modes, on the one hand, we use
the ZMap [10] port scanner on multiple machines to perform different scans over the
course of a week, and on the other hand, we continuously probe > 50% of the DNS
space. Table 1 summarized our weekly scan schedule, we did not specifically create
these scans and this schedule for this paper, it is the result of ongoing research efforts.
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Fig. 1: ICMP header structure. Type and this type’s sub type (code) determine message
contents, e.g., often packets triggering the ICMP message are quoted.
These scans typically involve scanning TCP/80 for TCP initial window configu-
rations [31] or TCP fast open support. Further, we investigate TCP/443 for HTTP/2-
support [38] and TLS, additionally, we scan on UDP 443 for Google QUIC (gQUIC) [32]
and IETF-QUIC (iQUIC). Our DNS-based scans are fueled by using our own resolvers to
resolve various record types for domains listed in zone files of multiple TLDs (e.g., .com,
.net, .org), which can be obtained from the registries, and we use A-records to investigate
TLS, HTTP/2, and gQUIC. All of our scans including the DNS resolutions originate
from a dedicated subnet. To collect all ICMP traffic that is directed towards these hosts,
we install a mirror port at their uplink switch and filter it to only contain ICMP traffic that
belongs to our measurement network. Since we perform no measurements that generate
ICMP messages themselves, we exclude those sent from our host (only ping responses)
leaving us with only incoming ICMP traffic.
Dataset. We base our observations on one full week in September 2018. In this week
we received 169 GB resp. ∼637.50M ICMPv41 messages (excluding those explicitly
triggered in Section 4). ICMP messages follow the structure shown in Figure 1, they are
fundamentally made up of a type field and, to further specify a subtype, a code field, and
depending on their value additional information may follow.
Type Count Uniq. IP Uniq. AS
Dest. Unreach. 476.68M 170.30M 52.92K
TimeExceeded 139.53M 455.13K 18.40K
Redirect 18.12M 243.25K 2.29K
EchoRequest 3.12M 10.64K 861
SourceQuench 46.18K 2.65K 364
Type Count Uniq. IP Uniq. AS
EchoReply 6.08K 301 58
Other 1.48K 606 43
TimestampReq. 73 9 6
Param.Problem 20 16 9
Addr.MaskReq. 4 1 1
Tab. 2: ICMP types with their occurrence frequency in our dataset. Ordered by frequency.
3 Study of ICMP Responses
To begin our investigations, we first summarize the ICMP responses to our scans by
looking at the distribution of ICMP message types and their frequency of occurrence in
Table 2. We observe 75 different ICMP type/code combinations during our observation
period with significantly different occurrence frequencies. While we mostly receive
standardized ICMP messages, we also receive some messages for which we could not
1 Please note that we do not have a fully IPv6-capable measurement infrastructure and thus focus
on IPv4 only.
find a standard, summarized as Other in Table 2, on which we do not further focus in
this paper. The table lists the total count of these messages as well as the number of
unique source IPs (router/end-host IPs) that generated the messages and number of ASes
they are contained in. Over the course of the week, we run different scans. Notably, on
Sundays and Mondays (see Table 1), no IPv4-wide ZMap scans are performed.
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Fig. 2: Number of ICMP messages receiver per hour and type over the course of a week.
Note the log scale and that we used a rolling sum over 1h.
Figure 2 thus puts the data from Table 2 into a temporal context showing the rolling
sum over 1h intervals of the major ICMP types. We observe that the ICMP traffic
varies over the course of the week, e.g., echo requests are rather static, other types like
destination unreachable mainly follow our ZMap scan schedule.
Quoted IP Packet. Apart from the different ICMP types, many ICMP messages contain
parts of the packet that caused the creation of the messages. We further inspect these
quoted IPv4 packets within the ICMP messages. From all received ICMP messages,
99.5% are supposed to contain IP packets (according to the RFCs), of these only 0.07%
cannot be decoded, e.g., because there is simply not enough data or these are no IPv4
packets. Of the decodable packets, we find 180.25M unique source IP/payload length
combinations, 76% are longer than 40 bytes, i.e., enough to inspect IP and TCP headers
when no options are used2, 24% are exactly 28 byte long, so just enough to inspect the
transport ports. Thus, when no options are used, the chances are high that ICMP mes-
sages received by an ICMP receiver can be demultiplexed to the respective application
process. This extends the finding in [27] that showed a prevalence of 28 byte responses
for TCP traceroutes. Next, we focus on the destination address field within the
quoted IP header. These should correspond to addresses which are targeted by our
scanners. Interestingly, from all ICMP messages, we find over 1.06M messages with des-
tination IPs that are in reserved address space, i.e., unallocated or private addresses (e.g.,
192.168.0.0/24). Since all our scanners explicitly blacklist these IP addresses, we believe
that these messages are produced behind network address translations (NATs). We next
use the contained source addresses to understand the relation to our measurements.
2 To reduce the capture size, our packet capture caps packets at 98 byte allowing no further
investigation, we find 67% having the maximum capture size.
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Fig. 3: ICMP messages triggered by ZMap and DNS-based scans.
Takeaway. ICMP traffic shows a temporal correlation to measurement traffic, most
messages indicate unreachability. In our collected dataset, quoted IP packets typically
contain enough information to inspect everything up to the end of the TCP header.
Further, a substantial number of messages seems to be generated behind NATs allowing
to peek into private address spaces.
3.1 Responses to Individual Measurements
Since we perform a variety of different measurements independent of this study, our
first investigation is how different measurements affect the generation of ICMP traffic.
To this end, we compare two ZMap scans and a purely DNS-based scan. For the ZMap
scans, we focus on one that enumerates reachable TCP port 80 (HTTP) and UDP port
443 (QUIC) hosts, for DNS, we use a scan that probes for HTTP/2 support via TCP port
443. We are able to clearly tie the ICMP messages to the different scans via IPs and ports
either from the quoted IP message or from IP itself.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of ICMP types and codes (top 8) that we receive
for the respective scans. As already indicated by Table 2, we receive a large amount of
destination unreachable messages. However, depending on the scan, their amount and
share greatly vary, especially when looking at the respective code. For example, unreach-
able ports are very common for our UDP-based ZMap scan, however, in comparison,
the TCP-based ZMap scan shows only a small fraction of unreachable ports. This is
no surprise as TCP should reply with a RST-packet if a port is unreachable and does
typically not generate ICMP messages. In contrast, there is no such mechanism in UDP,
even through something comparable to TCP’s RST exists in QUIC. However, QUIC is
implemented in user-space, thus when the kernel cannot demultiplex a packet to a socket
it must resort to issuing an ICMP unreachable message. Looking at our DNS-based scan,
we still find that more than 20% of the ICMP messages signal unreachability through
ICMP in contrast to TCP RSTs, something that, e.g., the default ZMap TCP-SYN scan
module simply ignores in contrast to its UDP counterpart. Since in all major operat-
ing systems TCP handles signaling closed ports, we believe that these hosts issuing
ICMP replies are actively configured either in their own firewalls (e.g., iptables) or in
a dedicated firewall to do so. We find only 16.49K IPs issuing all 1.13M ICMP port
unreachable messages, supporting our assumption that dedicated machines filter this
traffic.
Looking at the other types/codes, we find that a non-negligible share of ICMP
messages indicate that hosts are not reachable via the Internet either due to TTLs
expiring or because their host or network cannot be reached. Apart from this, we observe
that TCP port 443 is often firewalled (HostProhibited).
Takeaway. Depending on the protocol and port, we get different feedback from the Inter-
net’s control plane. Our findings indicate that, e.g., ICMP port unreachable messages
should not be ignored for TCP-based scans as is currently the case.
3.2 ICMP Echos
ICMP echo requests (Type: 8) are the typical ping to which an echo reply is sent.
RFC792 defines only a single code point, i.e., code = 0 which represents “no code”, still
we observe some non-standard code points. Some security scanners use non-standard
code points for operating system fingerprinting, e.g., a standard Linux will echo the
requested code point in its reply. Still, pings to our measurement infrastructure seem quite
common, for code = 0, we find 10.57K unique IPs out of 840 autonomous systems (ASes).
It seems that our scanning activities trigger systems to perform ping measurements
towards us, yet, we do not know their actual purpose. We suspect that this could be
caused by intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that monitor the liveness of our hosts.
Echo Replies. Since our hosts do not perform echo requests, we were surprised to find
echo replies in our dataset. We observe different code points with different frequencies
but overall we find over a couple of thousand of these replies. To investigate what
causes these seemingly orphaned messages, we inspect their destinations. Since our
measurements are identifiable either by IP or additionally by weekday, we associate
messages to measurements. We find most echo replies are with code = 3 (except for 5
messages), all 5.75K of these echos are destined to our DNS resolvers and originate
from only 86 IP addresses in 2 Chinese ASes. While many ICMP packets contain IP
quotations, echo replies typically do not, they usually mirror data contained in the
echo request. Yet, we still find IP packets together with DNS query responses that are
destined to our resolver. Thus, it seems that the packets are generated on the reverse path,
however, they are not sent back to the source (DNS server) but they are forwarded to the
destination (us). Inspecting the source IP within the IP fragments, we find IP addresses
from the same two ASes, as it turns out the 88 ICMP source IPs all respond to DNS
queries which hints at their use as a DNS server cluster. Yet, we were unable to manually
trigger these ICMP reply packets when trying to send DNS requests to these IPs, we
only observed that DNS requests were always answered by two separate packets from
the same IP, however, with different DNS answers. Further, the packets seem to stem
from different IP stacks (significantly different TTLs, use of IP ID or not, don’t fragment
bit set or not). While the different stack fingerprints could be the result of middleboxes
altering the IP headers, the general pattern that we observe hints at DNS spoofing.
3.3 Source Quench
ICMP Source Quench (SQ) messages (Type: 4, Code: 0) were a precursor of today’s
ECN mechanism, used to signal congestion at end-hosts and routers. The original idea
(RFC792 [29]) was that a router should signal congestion by sending SQ messages to
the sources that cause the congestion. In turn, these hosts should react, e.g., by reducing
their packet rate. However, research [12] found that SQ is ineffective in e.g., establishing
fairness and IETF has deprecated SQ-generation in 1995 [2] and SQ-processing in 2012
in general [17]. Major operating systems ignore SQ-messages for TCP at least since
2005 to counter blind throughput-reduction attacks [16]. Further, [13] claims that SQ is
rarely used because it consumes bandwidth in times of congestion.
In our traces, we observe 2.65K unique IPs located in 364 ASes issuing SQ messages,
despite the deprecation. Out of these IPs, 34.42 % are located in only 5 ASes. More-
over, 609 IPs that generate SQ messages were directly contacted by our measurement
infrastructure, i.e., are the original destination of the request causing this SQ message (ac-
cording to the IPv4 header contained within the ICMP message). Among the remaining
SQ messages, we find a few messages where the original destination and the source of
the SQ messages are located in ASes of different operators, i.e., possible transit networks.
Exemplarily, we observe that IPs located in AS1668 (AOL Transit Data Network) and
AS7018 (AT&T) issued SQ messages when IPs located in AS8452 (Telecom Egypt)
were contacted. As a final step, we see that 53 destination IPs in our measurements
trigger the generation of SQ messages and are also contained in A-records of our DNS
data that we collect. Out of these 53 IPs, 22 IPs generated the SQ messages themselves,
i.e., no on-path intermediary caused the creation of this message.
In addition, we checked how vendors implement or handle this feature. Cisco re-
moved the SQ feature from their IOS system after Version 12 in the early 2000s [5].
Hewlett Packard’s cluster management system (Serviceguard) generated SQ messages
due to a software bug in a read queue, which was fixed by a patch in 2010 [22]. In
their router configuration manual (September 2017), Nokia also marks SQ messages as
deprecated [28]. Although we cannot identify devices and their operating system version
in our measurements, we assume that some devices are not updated to a current version
or are following a configuration that enables them to generate SQ messages. This is not
forbidden per se but given that ICMP SQ creation was deprecated over 20 years ago, our
findings highlight that removing features from the Internet is a long term endeavor.
3.4 Redirect
ICMP redirect messages (Type: 5), are sent by gateways/routers to signal routes to
hosts. While [15] finds networks which require redirect messages to be architected sub-
optimally in the first place, RFC1812 [2] states that a router must not generate redirect
messages unless three properties are fulfilled: i) The packet is being forwarded out the
same physical interface that it was received from, ii), the IP source address in the packet
is on the same logical IP (sub)network as the next-hop IP address, and iii), the packet
does not contain an IP source route option. Similar checks [4] are used by receiving
hosts to check the validity of the message (e.g., redirected gateway and issuing router
must be on the same network).
Since none of the 18.12M redirect messages originate from our network, the routers
generating them either violate rule ii) or some obscure address translation is in place
on their networks. In our data, we even find roughly 2.7K unique redirects to private
address space. Within our dataset, we observed 105.78K network redirects and 18.01M
host redirects. Network redirects are problematic since no netmask is specified and it
Type Code Count
Dest. Unreach. Port 256.72M
TimeExceeded TTLExceeded 139.52M
Dest. Unreach.
Host 107.15M
CommProhibited 71.70M
HostProhibited 23.07M
Net 17.94M
Protocol 51.04K
Type Code Count
Dest. Unreach.
Frag.Needed 26.66K
NetProhibited 26.28K
TimeExceeded Frag.Reassembly 7.31K
Dest. Unreach.
HostUnknown 336
NetTOS 25
NetUnknown 6
SourceIsolated 2
Tab. 3: ICMP messages received indicating some form of unreachability with known
type and code ordered by frequency.
is up to the receiving router to interpret this correctly. For this reason, RFC1812 [2]
demands that routers must not send this type. We find that the network redirects originate
from 238 different ASes affecting nearly 19k different destinations of which less than
20 are mapped in any of our DNS data. Yet, all these ASes thus contain questionable
router configurations that are outdated at least since 1995. Similarly, we find that the
much larger fraction of host redirects originate from 2.20K ASes that affected over 400k
destinations of which we find roughly 900 mapped in our DNS data. This suggests that
a substantial number of end-systems are connected via sub-optimally architected or
misconfigured networks.
3.5 Unreachable Hosts
Reachability is a fundamental requirement to establish any means of communication.
Given that Table 2 lists 476.68M destination unreachable messages this looks trouble-
some at first. Yet, not all unreachability is bad, e.g., firewalls actively protect infrastruc-
ture from unpermitted access, i.e., when iptables rejects a packet (in contrast to simply
dropping it) it generates an ICMP response. By default, a port unreachable message
(Type: 3, Code: 3) is produced but other types can be manually specified by the network
operator. Our scans in themselves certainly trigger a certain amount of firewalls or some
IDSs. In contrast, when a path is too long and the IP TTL reaches zero, routers typically
generate an ICMP TTL exceeded message indicating that the destination is not reachable
but this time due to the network’s structure. Similarly, ICMP destination unreachable
messages for host unreachable (Type: 3, Code: 1) should indicate that there is currently
simply no path to a host, e.g., because it is not connected or the link is down. Table 3
summarizes the unreachability that we observe in our dataset.
As already indicated in Section 3.1, our UDP-based ZMap scans have the highest
share of port unreachable messages putting them at the top. We inspect the origin of
the messages and the actual destination that our scans targeted to see if the end-hosts
generate the messages or an intermediate firewall. It seems that 96% of the messages are
indeed generated by end-hosts or machines that can answer on their behalf (NATs).
Host and Network. Unreachable hosts and networks codes are used to give hints that
currently no path is available and the RFCs explicitly note that this may be due to a
transient state and that such a message is not proof of unreachability. To check for
transient states, we compare the unreachable hosts on Thursday with those on Friday
in our ZMap (both UDP 443) scan and additionally with the same scan (Thursday) one
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Fig. 4: Different scans (left to right of each plot) trigger different amount of host un-
reachable messages. (a) compares the changes within one day. (b) within one week.
week later (captured separately from our initial dataset) and investigate if hosts become
reachable that were unreachable before or vice versa.
Figure 4 visualizes the change between these two days (a) and within one week
(b) for host unreachable messages. We can see that within two days, the majority of
hosts remain unreachable, a small number of hosts that were previously reachable3
become unreachable, similarly, previously unreachable hosts become reachable. Looking
at the changes within a full week, we observe that the total amount of unreachable hosts
stays the same, however, roughly the same amount of previously reachable host become
unreachable and vice versa. To dig into these once unreachable and then reachable hosts,
we inspect to which AS they belong finding that 82% of all hosts are from the same
ASes. A possible explanation might be that while our observations seem to indicate a
change, the ICMP message generation is subject to rate-limiting [20]. Thus there might
be routers that generated unreachable messages on Thursday for a certain host, however,
this router could be subject to rate-limiting on Friday for the same host or the week after
leading to a false impression of reachability and continuity, still, a substantial number of
hosts remain unreachable. Another possibility is that some hosts are only up at certain
times of the day leading to differences in the reachability.
Time Exceeded. Similar to host unreachability, Time Exceeded messages (Type:11)
indicate unreachability but due to network issues. Either the Fragment Reassembly
(Code: 1) time was exceeded, i.e., the time that IP datagrams are buffered until they
can be reassembled when IP fragmentation happens, or the TTL runs out (Code: 0),
i.e., the path length exceeds the sender-defined limit. For the former, we find some
thousand messages but they stem from only 30 ASes, since many of our scans use small
packets, fragmentation is unlikely in the first place. Yet, for example, the UDP ZMap
scans use roughly 1300 byte per packet which is in the range of typical [7] MTUs when
fragmentation could occur. Since the default ZMap functions to create IP packets (which
we use) do not set the don’t fragment bit, only some of our measurements trigger the
26.66K fragmentation needed and DF set ICMP messages (see Table 3). However, over
time, these ICMP messages could give valuable insights into path MTU in the Internet.
3 With reachable we actually mean not unreachable, i.e., we do not get ICMP unreachable
messages, which must not mean that this host was reached by the scan.
TTL Exceeded messages have the second largest occurrence (139.52M) within
our dataset. They were produced in 18.40K different ASes covering 35.5M different
destinations that our scans tried to reach of which ∼32K are again present in A-records
of our DNS data and are thus unreachable. We inspect the TTL field of the quoted IP
packets that triggered the ICMP messages to see if the TTL was actually zero when the
message was generated. To do so, we first generate all unique pairs of router IP and TTL
values and then count the different TTLs observed. Out of these, 97% of the TTLs show a
value of one, followed by ∼2.4% with a zero, we expect these two, since a router should
drop a TTL = 0 or, depending on the internal pipeline, also TTL = 1, when the packet
is to be forwarded. Nevertheless, we also find larger TTLs, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 directly
follow in frequency, yet, we also find some instances of over 200 or even 255. The very
large TTLs could hint at middleboxes or routers rewriting the TTL when they generate
the message to hide their actual hop count. The lower numbers could be indicators for
MPLS networks. By default, e.g., Cisco [6] and Juniper [25] routers copy the IP TTL to
the MPLS TTL on ingress and also decrement the IP TTL within the MPLS network. It
is possible to separate IP TTL and MPLS TTL and there are heated discussions whether
one should hide the MPLS network from traceroutes or not which has also been subject
of investigations [8]. Thus packets expiring within an MPLS network will still trigger an
ICMP TTL exceeded, however, the quoted IP packet will have the TTL value they had at
the MPLS ingress router, thus, if the IP TTL is still copied at ingress a traceroute could
still reason about an MPLS network.
Since we were surprised to see this many TTL exceeded messages across all scanner
types (see Section 3.1), we checked our scanners to see which TTL they were actually
using to see if our setup simply has too small values. All our ZMap-based scanners
initialize the TTL field with its maximum of 255 possible hops, all scanners building on
top of the transport layer interfaces, in contrast, use the current Linux default of 64 hops
as also recommended in RFC1700 [30]. Given that we are at least on the recommended
hop count, this leaves us with three possibilities, i) the current recommendation of 64
is too low to reach these hosts, ii) there are middleboxes modifying the TTL to a much
lower value, or, iii) there are routing loops on the path to these hosts. After shortly
summarizing our findings, we continue by exploring the latter.
3.6 Summary
As the previous sections have shown, our Internet-wide scans produce an insightful
secondary dataset of ICMP responses. Driven by these messages, we identified a potential
DNS spoofer, found that long deprecated source quench messages are still generated in
today’s Internet and that ICMP redirects are sent across different administrative domains
pointing to several outdated and misconfigured networks. Without crafting a dedicated
dataset, our scans enable us to study Internet reachability and we believe that longitudinal
studies offer a way to deal with the challenge of ICMP rate-limiting.
4 Routing Loops
Routing loops are an undesirable control plane misconfiguration that render destination
networks unreachable and that challenge a link’s load [36]. In essence, IP’s TTL protects
the Internet from indefinitely looping packets and thus ICMP TTL messages inform the
sender that a router dropped a packet after exceeding the allowed number of router hops
(TTL). While the potential for routing loops is known, only a few studies investigated
their presence a decade ago [21, 37], current information on the presence and prevalence
is missing. Therefore, we study routing loops on the basis of ICMP TTL exceeded
messages triggered by our scans. We further argue that routing loops can be frequently
investigated as a by-product of Internet-wide scans that are regularly conducted for
different purposes.
4.1 Methodology: Detecting Loops
ICMP TTL exceeded messages are not necessarily caused by loops, also overly large
paths or middleboxes could trigger these messages. To investigate whether or not an
actual loop is present, we perform traceroutes for the original destinations (in the
quoted IP) of the ICMP TTL exceeded messages. Since our traceroutes are subject to
ICMP rate-limiting, especially when packets start to loop, we customize traceroute. Our
traceroute slows down its sending rate when detecting an already seen IP address (loop
indicator), otherwise, it follows the design of Paris traceroute [1] reusing flow identifiers
for each hop to trigger the same forwarding behavior in ECMP-like load balancers.
Since the traceroutes can still be noisy due to hosts that do not generate ICMP at all
or are still subject to rate-limiting, especially when also other traffic flows into a loop,
we put strong demands on our loop. For each hop on the path that does not generate a
reply, we assign a new unique label, all others are simply labeled by the answering IP.
From this list of labels, we create a directed graph connecting each label-induced node
to its successor and on this path we compute all elementary cycles using [24]. On an
elementary cycle, no node appears twice except that the first and last node are the same.
Then, on each of these possible cycles we inspect the node with the highest degree, and
if this node’s degree is larger than 54, we mark this traceroute as having a loop. This
will yield loops as long as at least one router in the loop generated ICMP TTL exceeded
messages, which we found to work reasonably well when traceroute pauses the packet
generation for at least 500 ms when observing an already seen IP address. Thus in a loop
of two routers, we will send each router a packet roughly every second.
4.2 Routing Loops in the Wild
We seed our traceroutes by ICMP TTL exceeded messages generated from our Internet-
wide scans5. Since we get way too many TTL exceeded messages to traceroute them all
without generating substantial rate-limiting, we restrict us to a single traceroute for each
unique /24 subnet within 30-minute intervals. Thus for two TTL exceeded messages
for a destination from the same /24 subnet, we only perform a single traceroute if the
messages arrive within 30 minutes.
For our assessment of routing loops, we investigate TTL exceeded messages in the
last week of August 2018. To avoid rate-limiting we also limit our traceroutes that we
4 This is basically a precaution against bad load balancers traded against the required TTL.
5 Our dataset excludes TTL exceeded messages generated by these traceroutes.
perform in parallel; generating all traceroutes for this single week took us until the end of
September 2018. While this skews our data, it enables us to reason about the persistence
of these loops since every 30 minutes the same /24 could be scheduled for a rescan. In
total, we performed ∼27M traceroutes to ∼612K different /24 subnets from 28K ASes,
of these, 439K subnets from 19.8K ASes are unreachable due to a loop. We further
inspect how many loops are present and if loops are only within a single AS or whether
loops cross AS borders and are thus potentially on a peering link. To do so, we count
the number of distinct loops and ASes involved in the loops and find 167K different
loops in 13.9K ASes. Of these loops, 136K have IPs for all routers involved in the loop,
thus allowing an in-depth inspection. Looking at the ASes involved, we find that 13%
(17.7K) already cover all different ASes paths involved (i.e., we replaced each IP by the
respective AS), of these 4.8K cross AS boundaries. The top three ASes involved in the
loops are AS171 (Cogent) a Tier-1, AS9498 (BHARTI Airtel Ltd.), an Indian ISP, and
AS3549 (Level 3), again a Tier-1.
Persistence. To investigate the persistence, we restrict our view to traceroutes that were
performed two weeks after the initial TTL exceeded message was triggered by our
Internet-wide scans. In contrast to our previous observation, loops from roughly 150
ASes disappear, yet, we still find 4.6K loops crossing AS borders, in total still rendering
404K subnets unreachable. Thus, most loops seem to persist and are not resolved.
Loops at our Upstream ISP. Within our data, we also found loops in the AS of our
upstream ISP. We contacted the ISP about our findings which they were able to confirm.
Since many of the loops are outside of their administrative domain even though they
manage the address space, they were still able to give us more details on a loop that
they were able to fix. For one loop, they found that the first router had a static route for
our tested destination towards its next hop, yet, the next hop had no specific forwarding
information for this destination and thus used its default gateway, which however was
the previous router with the static route thus causing the loop.
Takeaway. Routing loops seem to persist in large parts of the Internet, challenging the
question if the address space cut off by the loops is in use after all or if there are other
routers that would be taken from different vantage points. We believe routing loops have
a huge potential for causing congestion when exploited and thus a persistent monitoring
seeded by large-scale Internet measurements that informs operators could be a long-term
attempt to reduce routing loops.
5 Related Work
Our work relates to approaches analyzing ICMP traffic and its generation in general, as
well as approaches that focus on particular studies built upon ICMP, e.g., path/topology
discovery and routing loops. In the following, we discuss similarities and differences to
our work but we remark that the body of works building on top of ICMP is far larger but
conceptually differ in that they do not analyze ICMP as a by-product.
Bano et al. [3] also use ZMap and capture all (cross-layer) responses to probe traffic
to infer IP liveness but run specific measurements to generate this traffic, we believe
that our dataset could be used to perform a similar analysis. Malone et al. [27] analyze
the correctness of ICMP quotations. They base their analysis on a dataset obtained
via tcptraceroute in 2005, targeting around 84K web servers. While most of the
reported messages are of type ICMP time exceeded, they also find around 100 source
quench messages, which were already deprecated then. As we have shown, by looking
at the ICMP responses to Internet-wide scans, we are able to update their findings on a
regular basis without having to craft a dedicated dataset. Guo et al. [19] present FADER,
an approach to detect the presence of ICMP rate-limiting in measurement traces. While
we did not focus on rate-limiting, we found indicators for rate-limiting. We believe that
longitudinal studies seeded by Internet-wide scans can, in the long run, help to overcome
limited visibility due to rate-limiting.
In 2002, Hengartner et al. [21] have characterized and analyzed the presence of
routing loops in a Tier-1 ISP backbone trace. Xia et al. [36, 37] have further tracerouted
over 9M IP addresses to find routing loops in 2005. Transient routing loops have also
been subject to investigation [35] and they are well studied [14, 33]. Lone et al. [26]
investigate routing loops in CAIDA data to study source address validation but do
not focus on their prevalence in the Internet, further, in contrast to using the CAIDA
dataset that actively runs traceroutes against all /24, we utilize indications from ongoing
measurement data to investigate loops. While these works show that routing loops are a
known problematic misconfiguration, their presence in the Internet has not been analyzed
for over 10 years. By recycling Internet-wide scans, we can seed such investigations and
enable persistent monitoring of this phenomenon showing that routing loops are still a
problem today.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we used ICMP responses triggered by large-scale Internet measurements
to study how the Internet’s control plane reacts to these measurements. Thereby, we
found that these responses are hidden treasures that are typically neglected but offer great
insights into the configuration of Internet-connected systems. Our analyses of different
ICMP responses led us to many misconfigured routers, e.g., sending ICMP redirects
across the Internet, or outdated systems, e.g., generating long-deprecated source quench
messages. Further, our analysis showed a large and nuanced degree of unreachability in
the Internet. More specifically, our scans hint at the existence of routing loops, which we
found to persist in large parts of the Internet. We hope that these ICMP by-products are
analyzed by more researchers when performing large-scale measurements and that the
regular nature of these scans will enable persistent monitoring of the Internet’s control
plane and that, especially when brought to the attention of operators, misconfigurations
can be fixed. To this end, we make our dataset publicly available at [23].
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